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THE CHALLENGE OF DEMOCRATIC
LAWYERING
Ascanio Piomelli*
INTRODUCTION
Do democratic values potentially inform the work of lawyers? Do
democratic ideals have implications for how lawyers structure relationships
with clients? Can lawyers contribute to strengthening democracy in the
United States? Can they increase the participation of the "disenfranchised"
in our democracy? For a growing number of lawyers and theorists
committed to pursuing progressive social change, the answer to each of
these questions posed by this Symposium is an emphatic "yes."
These lawyers and theorists comprise a broad movement that stresses the
importance of lawyers' working collaboratively with (not simply on behalf
oj) low-income and working-class people, people of color, and their groups
and communities to collectively push for social change.1 Lawyers in this
* Professor of Clinical Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, Civil
Justice Clinic. I thank Russ Pearce, Jessi Tamayo, and the Louis Stein Center for Law &
Ethics for inviting me to participate in this Symposium on the Lawyer's Role in a
Contemporary Democracy. I thank Mark Aaronson, Miye Goishi, and Holly Miller for their
comments on drafts of this essay.
1. The literature describing this movement is extensive. Its founder and preeminent
theorist is Jerry L6pez, author of the defining work in the field. See GERALD P. L6PEZ,
REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992)
[hereinafter L6PEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING]; see also Gerald P. L6pez, An Aversion to
Clients: Loving Humanity and Hating Human Beings, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 315
(1996); Gerald P. L6pez, A Declaration of War by Other Means, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1667
(1985) (reviewing RICHARD E. MORGAN, DISABLING AMERICA: THE "RIGHTS INDUSTRY" IN
OUR TIME (1984)); Gerald P. L6pez, Economic Development in the "Murder Capital of the
Nation," 60 TENN. L. REV. 685 (1993) [hereinafter L6pez, Economic Development]; Gerald
P. L6pez, Keynote Address: Living and Lawyering Rebelliously, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2041
(2005); Gerald P. L6pez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice: Seven Weeks in the Life of a
Re[b]ellious Collaboration, 77 GEO. L.J. 1603 (1989) [hereinafter L6pez, Reconceiving Civil
Rights Practice]; Gerald P. L6pez, Shaping Community Problem Solving Around Community
Knowledge, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 59 (2004).
Another influential early proponent was Lucie White. See Lucie E. White,
Collaborative Lawyering in the Field? On Mapping Paths from Rhetoric to Practice, I
CLINICAL L. REV. 157 (1994) [hereinafter White, Collaborative Lawyering]; Lucie White,
"Democracy" in Development Practice: Essays on a Fugitive Theme, 64 TENN. L. REV.
1073 (1997); Lucie E. White, Facing South: Lawyering for Poor Communities in the
Twenty-First Century, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 813, 822-29 (1998); Lucie E. White,
Goldberg v. Kelly on the Paradox of Lawyering for the Poor, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 861
(1990); Lucie E. White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making Space for
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Clients to Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 535 (1988) [hereinafter White,
Mobilization on the Margins]; Panel III.- Creating Models for Progressive Lawyering in the
21st Century, 9 J.L. & POL'Y 297, 303-20 (2001) [hereinafter Progressive Lawyering in the
21st Century] (comments of Lucie White); Lucie White, Paradox, Piece-Work, and
Patience, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 853 (1992); Lucie E. White, The Power Beyond Borders, 70
Miss. L.J. 865, 874-76 (2001); Lucie White, Representing "The Real Deal," 45 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 271 (1990-91); Lucie E. White, Seeking ". .. The Faces of Otherness...": A
Response to Professors Sarat, Felstiner, and Cahn, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1499 (1992); Lucie
E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the
Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990); Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach:
Lessons from Driefontein on Lawyering and Power, 1988 WIs. L. REV. 699 [hereinafter
White, To Learn and Teach].
Other important voices describing approaches to social-change lawyering that I place
within this movement include: LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP:
ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT (2001);
JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS (2005)
[hereinafter GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS]; Muneer I. Ahmad, Interpreting
Communities: Lawyering Across Language Difference, 54 UCLA L. REV. 999 (2007);
Sameer M. Ashar, Law Clinics and Collective Mobilization, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 355 (2008)
[hereinafter Ashar, Collective Mobilization]; Sameer M. Ashar, Public Interest Lawyers and
Resistance Movements, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1879 (2007) [hereinafter Ashar, Resistance
Movements]; Susan D. Bennett, Little Engines that Could: Community Clients, Their
Lawyers, and Training in the Arts of Democracy, 2002 WIs. L. REV. 469; Luke W. Cole,
Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The Need for Environmental
Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619 (1992); Luke W. Cole, Macho Law Brains, Public
Citizens, and Grassroots Activists: Three Models of Environmental Advocacy, 14 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 687 (1995) [hereinafter Cole, Models of Environmental Advocacy]; Sheila
Foster, Justice from the Ground Up: Distributive Inequities, Grassroots Resistance, and the
Transformative Politics of the Environmental Justice Movement, 86 CAL. L. REV. 775
(1998); Sheila R. Foster & Brian Glick, Integrative Lawyering: Navigating the Political
Economy of Urban Redevelopment, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1999 (2007); Jennifer Gordon, The
Lawyer Is Not the Protagonist: Community Campaigns, Law, and Social Change, 95 CAL.
L. REV. 2133 (2007) [hereinafter Gordon, Not the Protagonist]; Jennifer Gordon, We Make
the Road by Walking: Immigrant Workers, the Workplace Project, and the Struggle for
Social Change, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407 (1995) [hereinafter Gordon, We Make the
Road]; Angela Harris, Margaretta Lin & Jeff Selbin, From "The Art of War" to "Being
Peace ": Mindfulness and Community Lawyering in a Neoliberal Age, 95 CAL. L. REV. 2073
(2007); Bill Ong Hing, Coolies, James Yen, and Rebellious Advocacy, 14 ASIAN AM. L.J. 1
(2007); Shin Imai, A Counter-Pedagogy for Social Justice: Core Skills for Community-
Based Lawyering, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 195 (2002); Shauna I. Marshall, Mission Impossible?:
Ethical Community Lawyering, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 147 (2000); Progressive Lawyering in
the 21st Century, supra, at 320-27 (comments of Luke Cole); Ascanio Piomelli,
Appreciating Collaborative Lawyering, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 427 (2000); Ascanio Piomelli,
The Democratic Roots of Collaborative Lawyering, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 541 (2006)
[hereinafter Piomelli, Democratic Roots]; Ascanio Piomelli, Foucault's Approach to Power:
Its Allure and Limits for Collaborative Lawyering, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 395 [hereinafter
Piomelli, Foucault's Allure and Limits]; William P. Quigley, Reflections of Community
Organizers: Lawyering for Empowerment of Community Organizations, 21 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 455 (1995); Dean Hill Rivkin, Lawyering, Power, and Reform: The Legal Campaign
to Abolish the Broad Form Mineral Deed, 66 TENN. L. REV. 467 (1999); Laura L. Rovner,
Disability, Equality, and Identity, 55 ALA. L. REV. 1043 (2004); Julie A. Su, Making the
Invisible Visible: The Garment Industry's Dirty Laundry, I J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 405
(1998); Christine Zuni Cruz, [On the] Road Back in: Community Lawyering in Indigenous
Communities, 5 CLINICAL L. REV. 557 (1999).
In linking these authors and works, I am emphasizing connections and bonds that
some of the theorists whom I include in this movement seem not always to recognize or to
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emerging tradition emphasize working in concert with these clients, groups,
communities, and their allies. These lawyers do not see themselves as
saviors, protectors, or instructors of befuddled victims, nor as preeminent
engines or engineers of social change. Instead, they treat individual and
group clients as fellow citizens,2 able to speak out and to act collectively on
their own behalf These lawyers consider clients not just sources of
information on the problems they face, but active partners in working
collectively to solve those problems. These lawyers work alongside
individual clients, organized and informal groups, and any allies they can
enlist, in joint, multidimensional efforts to advocate for justice. Their aim
is not primarily legal reform, but rather the transformation of living
conditions for those whom our political economy and society routinely
deny dignity and equal justice. These lawyers do not categorically reject
law or litigation.3 But they are deeply skeptical of isolated litigation
embrace. In so doing, I do not deny that there are also significant differences in emphasis,
ideology, and practice among these authors and practitioners.
Anthony Alfieri has also associated his work with this approach to lawyering. See
Anthony V. Alfieri, The Antinomies of Poverty Law and a Theory of Dialogic
Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 659 (1987-88); Anthony V. Alfieri,
Disabled Clients, Disabling Lawyers, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 769 (1992); Anthony V. Alfieri,
Faith in Community: Representing "Colored Town," 95 CAL. L. REV. 1829 (2007);
Anthony V. Alfieri, Practicing Community, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1747 (1994) (reviewing
LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING, supra); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law
Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107 (1991); Anthony V.
Alfieri, Speaking out of Turn: The Story of Josephine V., 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcS 619
(1991); Anthony V. Alfieri, Stances, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1233 (1992); Anthony V. Alfieri,
(Un)covering Identity in Civil Rights and Poverty Law, 121 HARV. L. REV. 805 (2008). For
my reservations about his works in the 1980s and 1990s and the fit between his emphases
and my own, see Piomelli, Appreciating Collaborative Lawyering, supra, at 457-70 and
Piomelli, Foucault's Allure and Limits, supra, at 459 n.299, 467 n.331, 471 n.348.
2. By "citizen," I intend an active, self-governing member-regardless of immigration
status-of a community of moral and political equals.
3. See, e.g., L6PEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING, supra note 1, at 38 (rebellious lawyers
"must . . . continually evaluate the likely interaction between legal and 'non-legal'
approaches to problems" -- an unnecessary undertaking if one universally eschewed legal
approaches (emphasis added)); Gordon, Not the Protagonist, supra note 1, at 2141 ("[L]aw
is one of many tools in the arsenal of social change tactics. It can neither be condemned nor
endorsed in the abstract, and the forms of its deployment, its usefulness, and its pitfalls must
always be worked out in relation to . . . a particular context."); Piomelli, Appreciating
Collaborative Lawyering, supra note 1, at 512 (noting that "the main lesson I learned was
not categorical, but contextual: not to avoid the law, but to put it in its [proper] place," by,
inter alia, "explor[ing] the full local context: its history, network of power relations, and the
operation of structural forces such as race, class, and gender"); Piomelli, Democratic Roots,
supra note 1, at 606 ("Most collaborative lawyers view litigation and other contexts in which
lawyers ... speak and act for ... clients as at least potentially appropriate and effective ....
But these lawyers also encourage joint exploration of other arenas or avenues where clients
and allies can engage in their own persuasive efforts so they are not always ... spoken for by
others.").
For democratic lawyers' favorable descriptions of specific instances of litigation,
see, for example, Ashar, Resistance Movements, supra note 1; L6pez, Economic
Development, supra note 1; Shauna I. Marshall, Class Actions as Instruments of Change:
Reflections on Davis v. City and County of San Francisco, 29 U.S.F. L. REv. 911 (1995); Su,
supra note 1; White, Mobilization on the Margins, supra note 1.
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conducted as a stand-alone approach to social change, unconnected to and
uninformed by collective public action. Instead, these lawyers favor plural,
multilateral efforts by multiple actors in a variety of spheres. They treat
litigation, lobbying, community and popular education, media campaigns,
political mobilization, and organizing as a range of options to fully explore
and to mix and match as each specific context warrants.
Many labels have been attached to this tradition, among them: rebellious
lawyering,4 collaborative lawyering, 5 critical lawyering,6 community
lawyering, 7 mobilization lawyering,8 and law and organizing. 9 I add to the
cacophony by suggesting this approach is usefully understood as
democratic lawyering, because democracy-as these lawyers and their
partners conceive it-is central to their aspirations, values, and methods.
As Part I outlines, the vision of democracy that lies at the heart of this
approach to lawyering centers on the robust participation of ordinary
citizens and their groups in individual and collective self-government across
a range of settings. This expansive understanding of democracy, which
these lawyers and their partners strive to bring to life, challenges the thinner
4. See L6PEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING, supra note 1.
5. See Piomelli, Appreciating Collaborative Lawyering, supra note 1, at 441; Piomelli,
Foucault's Allure and Limits, supra note 1, at 398; White, Collaborative Lawyering, supra
note 1, at 159; see also Michael Diamond, Community Lawyering: Revisiting the Old
Neighborhood, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 67, 82-90 (2000); Hing, supra note 1, at 2-3
(calling L6pez, White, and Piomelli theorists of collaborative approach to community
lawyering); Richard D. Marsico, Working for Social Change and Preserving Client
Autonomy: Is There a Role for "Facilitative" Lawyering?, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 639, 654
(1995); Rovner, supra note 1, at 1090-96; Anthony C. Thompson, Navigating the Hidden
Obstacles to Ex-offender Reentry, 45 B.C. L. REV. 255, 299 n.271 (2004).
6. See Katherine R. Kruse, Fortress in the Sand: The Plural Values of Client-Centered
Representation, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 369, 394-97 (2006); Binny Miller, Give Them Back
Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative in Case Theory, 93 MICH. L. REV. 485, 486
(1994); Louise G. Trubek, Critical Lawyering: Toward a New Public Interest Practice, I
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 49 (1991).
7. See Marshall, supra, note 1; Zuni Cruz, supra, note 1; see also Karen Tokarz, Nancy
L. Cook, Susan Brooks & Brenda Bratton Blom, Conversations on "Community
Lawyering ": The Newest (Oldest) Wave in Clinical Legal Education, 28 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL'Y 359 (2008); Rose Cuison Villazor, Community Lawyering: An Approach to
Addressing Inequalities in Access to Health Care for Poor, of Color and Immigrant
Communities, 8 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 35 (2004). Angela Harris, Margaretta Lin,
and Jeff Selbin offer a subtle improvement: "lawyering in community." See Harris et al.,
supra note 1, at 2093.
8. See Scott L. Cummings, Mobilization Lawyering: Community Economic
Development in the Figueroa Corridor, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 302,
302-35 (Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 2006); Paul R. Tremblay, Acting "A Very
Moral Type of God": Triage Among Poor Clients, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2475, 2502-04
(1999).
9. See Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and
Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REV. 443, 447 (2001); Loretta Price & Melinda Davis, Seeds of
Change: A Bibliographic Introduction to Law and Organizing, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 615 (2000-01). Jennifer Gordon even more helpfully suggests: "law in the service
of organizing." Gordon, Not the Protagonist, supra note 1, at 2141 (emphasis omitted).
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conceptionI0 that currently prevails (and long has prevailed) in mainstream
U.S, culture and society. I I
Several democratic lawyers have recently noted that their approach to
lawyering and social change is a response to the political economic agenda
of neoliberalism,12 with its evisceration of limits on the power of employers
and property owners, shredding of social safety nets, rampant privatization
of public assets, and shriveling of the public domain.13 And they are right.
Democratic lawyers and those with whom they join do aim to limit the
power of employers and property owners, in order to enable ordinary people
to protect themselves, their families, and communities from market forces.
These lawyers and their partners seek to restore public assets, enlarge the
public domain, and to reinvigorate public discourse by including the voices,
ideas, and initiatives of low-income and working-class people, people of
color, and their groups and communities.
As Part II sketches, in addition to reinterpreting democracy and
confronting neoliberalism, democratic lawyering also challenges other key
elements of the cognitive and cultural conditioning of mainstream U.S.
culture-elements that long predate neoliberalism and its rise over the past
thirty years. Democratic lawyering contests individualistic, aristocratic, and
formalistic predilections that have long pervaded, even as they have not
monopolized, mainstream culture and lawyers' professional socialization.
Democratic lawyering challenges, for example, deep-seated conventional
predispositions-held not simply by conservatives, but also by many who
consider themselves liberal or progressive-about individuals and groups,
intelligence and expertise, and the comparative attention we pay to formal
rights or to the actual power of individuals and groups to change their lives.
I. PURSUING A REDEFINED, DISTINCTIVELY PARTICIPATORY AND
EGALITARIAN DEMOCRACY
Democratic lawyers challenge orthodox understandings of what
democracy means and how it is practiced. These lawyers reject the reigning
protective, elite-centered view that democracy is simply a prudential device
for ensuring that expert leaders are incentivized to govern wisely on behalf
10. See BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A
NEW AGE 3-25 (20th anniversary ed. 2003) (1984).
11. For an exposition of the historical roots of this participatory vision of democracy, its
affinity with and influence on these lawyers' core values, and its manifestation in their
practices, see Piomelli, Democratic Roots, supra note 1.
12. See Ashar, Collective Mobilization, supra note 1, at 360-64; Ashar, Resistance
Movements, supra note 1, at 1879; Foster & Glick, supra note 1, at 2018-25; Harris et al.,
supra note 1, at 2088-93, 2101-11.
13. For descriptions and interpretation of neoliberalism and its global ascendance since
the late 1970s, see DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM (2005);
NEOLIBERALISM: A CRITICAL READER (Alfredo Saad-Filho & Deborah Johnston eds., 2005);
see also LISA DUGGAN, THE TWILIGHT OF EQUALITY?: NEOLIBERALISM, CULTURAL POLITICS,
AND THE ATTACK ON DEMOCRACY (2003); Elizabeth Martinez & Arnoldo Garcia,
CORPWATCH, What Is Neoliberalism? A Brief Definition for Activists,
http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=376 (last visited Feb. 16, 2009).
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of primarily passive constituents. They also reject that view's analogue in
the lawyering domain: the expert lawyer who represents wisely on behalf
of passive clients. Instead, democratic lawyers envision-and with others
act upon-an inclusive, participatory, and egalitarian understanding of
democracy as a transformative approach to social change and relationships,
one that enhances the power of ordinary people and their groups to meet
their needs by actively participating in self-government and collective
public action.
A. The Prevailing Protective View of Democracy as a Device for Selecting
the Fittest to Wisely Govern and Represent the Otherwise Uninvolved
To the vast majority of people in the United States, democracy is simply
a political concept. It describes the political system in place throughout the
United States, as well as a normative expectation for other nations. Its
essence is an electorate that is provided an opportunity, by majority vote of
those opting to cast secret ballots, to select officials to govern on their
behalf for limited terms. Other prerequisites likely include sufficient
freedom of speech, assembly, and the press to enable candidates to
communicate with the electorate. Democracy in this view is fundamentally
a device for securing assent from those to be governed.
Among its chief theoretical virtues are the formally equal say it accords
each voter and the salutary incentive structure it institutes for public
officials-as the need to regularly appear before an electorate promotes
rulers' accountability and deters their misfeasance. Democracy, so
construed, is a system that protects against misgovernment. Its central
feature, voting, is chiefly valued for its ability to authorize political leaders
and to optimally shape their behavior.
If prompted, many in the United States would likely augment this
equation of democracy and voting with an insistence on the necessity of
institutional checks and balances to constrain the inevitable excesses of
majority rule. Incorporating the representative republican vision of James
Madison and his fellow Federalists into a term and concept (democracy)
that those thinkers rejected, 14 most in the United States likely view
constitutional constraints and judicial review as essential democratic
14. The Federalists believed in and designed a representative republican government,
not a democratic one. As James Madison wrote in the Federalist No. 10, "a pure
democracy," that is, "a society consisting of a small number of citizens who assemble and
administer the government in person," was doomed to factionalism and the tyranny of the
majority. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 76 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003). He
was convinced that "democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention;
have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have
in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths." Id. The
Federalists instituted instead a representative republic in which popular participation would
be narrowly cabined and actual governing delegated, in Madison's words, to "a chosen body
of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country and whose
patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial
considerations." id.
1388 [Vol. 77
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corequisites-necessary to curb popular excess and to protect minorities
from oppression by majorities.
Over the past half century, an essentially economic and elite-focused
model of democracy has risen to prominence. Developed by Joseph
Schumpeter, a far-rightist Austrian economist, 15 this model has deeply
influenced mainstream U.S. political scientists and has been propagated
widely by the media, politicians, and political parties. 16 In this view,
democracy is at root a marketplace in which politicians (and parties)
compete with each other to obtain the electorate's authorization to rule. Its
key actors are the political entrepreneurs who market themselves to voters
(and organized interest groups) to secure the right to govern. Voters are but
consumers, asked periodically to signal their preferences between
competing political brands. Assumed to be uninterested in politics and
public policy, voters are not expected to do much research; simply signaling
satisfaction or dissatisfaction with their own lives is sufficient. The actual
business of government-the deliberation over and formulation of public
policy and the shaping of economic and social behavior-is left to expert
political entrepreneurs (and to the organized interest groups who act
analogously to institutional investors in this market).
A fundamental, shared aspect of these mainstream glosses on democracy
is the idea of democracy as a mechanism to protect society from
misgovernment and to encourage rule by those expert leaders deemed fittest
for the task. The objective is to enable a natural aristocracy-not of birth,
but of talent-to rule. 17 Voters do not rule; they periodically pick their
rulers. In this view, democracy's chief impact or output is better leaders,
leaders disinclined to infringe on the liberties of those who may refuse to
reelect them. Voting may bring a modicum of self-satisfaction for doing
one's part, but it does not significantly shape the voter, who only plays this
role of picking among fixed choices one or two days a year. In democracy
so understood, politicians may be shaped, but not voters.
15. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (Harpers &
Bros. 1950) (1942). For a discussion of his political sympathies, see JOHN MEDEARIS,
JOSEPH SCHUMPETER'S Two THEORIES OF DEMOCRACY 19-77 (2001) (describing
Schumpeter's views as reactionary, monarchist, and pro-Nazi, even after emigrating to the
United States).
16. For a fuller discussion of the influence of this model of democracy on the pluralist
school of political science, as well as its propagation by U.S. media and politicians, see
Piomelli, Democratic Roots, supra note 1, at 551-54, 556. A leading contemporary
advocate of Joseph Schumpeter's view of democracy is Judge Richard Posner. See RICHARD
A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003).
17. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 14, at 77 (arguing for a representative
republic on grounds it would prove "most favorable to the election of proper guardians of the
public weal"); POSNER, supra note 16, at 109 (describing successful political candidates as
"belong[ing] to an elite of intelligence, cunning, connections, charisma and other
attributes"); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Oct. 28, 1813), in 2 THE
COMPLETE ADAMS-JEFFERSON LETTERS 387, 388 (Lester J. Cappon ed., 1959) (lauding
"natural aristocracy" of talent and virtue that would be elected to rule in the United States, in
contrast to "artificial aristocracy founded on wealth and birth" that ruled in Europe).
1389
HeinOnline  -- 77 Fordham L. Rev. 1389 2008-2009
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
In this vision of democracy, popular participation is an individual and
purely optional choice. To the extent it is of interest, the role of a rank-and-
file member of society is not so much to participate in governing as a
citizen, as it is to select one's governors as a voter.18 Voting itself, as it is
commonly understood, is an individual, even a solitary, action. Broad
popular participation is deemed unnecessary to conferring legitimacy.
Indeed, for many (especially among political, economic, and educational
elites), broad-based participation is actually undesirable, for people of lower
socio-economic status (who are most likely not to vote) are believed not to
share core democratic values and are deemed particularly susceptible to
authoritarian impulses. 19
B. Re-envisioning Democracy as an Inclusive, Participatory Approach to
Relationships and Social Change that Develops Wiser, Self-Governing
Individuals and Groups Able to Act in Concert with Others
Democratic lawyers act on an entirely different vision of democracy.
Their understanding returns to the original roots of the word. Demokratia
in ancient Greek was the combination of demos ("the people" or "the
common people") and kratos (typically translated as "rule," occasionally as
"power"). 20  To these lawyers and their partners, democracy means
enhancing the power of low-income and working-class people and people
of color to participate meaningfully in self-rule or self-government broadly
construed.21  The aim is to enhance citizens' participation in public
18. Although members of the U.S. populace are typically referred to as citizens, in this
prevailing view of democracy, the dominant role of a citizen is simply to vote-or to allow
officials to believe that she might vote.
19. These views have held sway for the past half century. See, e.g., BERNARD R.
BERELSON ET AL., VOTING: A STUDY OF OPINION FORMATION IN A PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN
314 (1954) (arguing widespread participation by a full range of citizens "might culminate in
rigid fanaticism that could destroy democratic processes"); THOMAS R. DYE & HARMON L.
ZEIGLER, THE IRONY OF DEMOCRACY: AN UNCOMMON INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN
POLITICS (12th ed. 2003); EDUCATING THE DEMOCRATIC MIND 271 (Walter C. Parker ed.,
1996) ("'[T]he masses of America are apathetic and ill-informed about politics and public
policy, and they have a surprisingly weak commitment to democratic values.... But
fortunately for these values and for American democracy, the American masses do not lead,
they follow' (quoting THOMAS R. DYE & HARMON L. ZEIGLER, THE IRONY OF DEMOCRACY:
AN UNCOMMON INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN POLITICS 2 (4th ed. 1978))); SEYMOUR MARTIN
LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN: THE SOCIAL BASES OF POLITICS 98 (1960) ("[S]tudies suggest...
lower-class way of life produces individuals with rigid and intolerant approaches to
politics."); Robert Lane, Fear of Equality, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 35, 51 (1959) (concluding,
from interviews with fifteen working-class and lower-middle-class men, that U.S.
professional classes are chief defenders of ideals of freedom and equality).
20. See ROBERT A. DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY 11 (1998); M.I. FINLEY, POLITICS IN THE
ANCIENT WORLD 1-2 (1983).
21. See, e.g., GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS, supra note 1, at 6, 141-47, 291-94
(discussing Workplace Project's "deep political and moral belief' in internal participatory
democracy and its salutary impact on individual members and on a group's capacity to take
on external battles); Ashar, Resistance Movements, supra note 1, at 1923-34 (describing
"new paradigm of social change . . . rooted in a radical democratic vision of the
participation.., in politics" of predominantly immigrant and of-color low-wage workers);
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deliberation and public action-not simply voters' selection of
representatives to engage on their behalf in that deliberation and action.
This democratic vision serves as an aspiration that guides these lawyers'
conduct and their pursuit of social change, especially at a local and
institutional level. It is not necessarily a universal model of political
governance that these lawyers aim to apply at the national level. Instead of
seeking to replace representative republican government, these democratic
lawyers and those with whom they join aim to resuscitate it with a strong
infusion of the popular participation that the Founding Fathers sought to
circumscribe. These lawyers strive to foster and team with energized
publics 22 of ordinary people that press their representatives (and their
nongovernmental adversaries) to respond to their needs. Democratic
lawyers collaborate with and nurture grassroots groups in which everyday
people participate in multiple realms of self-rule or self-government,
including tactical and strategic deliberation, public and behind-the-scenes
leadership, joint public action, and joint assessment of that action.
Democracy in this view is an egalitarian undertaking. At its heart is a
commitment to resisting subordination-i.e., relationships in which some
purport to rule over others, in which some dominate and others are expected
to submit-and eliminating deprivation. It is a rejection of second-class
status for anyone. 23 Democratic lawyers recognize the likelihood that
ordinary people will have to work hard together to force their way into
spaces and roles occupied by elites who purport to be and to know better.
As a kindred thinker writes, "Democracy is always a movement of an
energized public to make elites responsible"; it is "the taking back of one's
powers" from elites who proclaim to be better suited to rule. 24 Its aim is to
create actual equality, rather than simply formal equality: relationships in
which parties interact as fellow citizens, rather than as superiors and
subordinates. Democratic citizenship entails a horizontal relationship with
one's equals, instead of a vertical relationship to a sovereign. In the words
of another like-minded theorist, "democracy is about the public life of
citizens, about ordinary human beings venturing 'out' to take part in
deliberations over shared concerns, to contest exclusions from the material
and ideal advantages of a free society, and to invent new forms and
practices." 25
Foster, supra note 1, at 838-41 (discussing "strong version of participatory democracy"
practiced by grassroots environmental justice groups).
22. See infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
23. As then-U.S. Senator Joseph Biden stated in accepting the Democratic Party's 2008
nomination for Vice-President, "My mother's creed is the American creed: No one is better
than you. You are everyone's equal, and everyone is equal to you." Senator Joseph Biden,
Acceptance Speech at the Democratic National Convention (Aug. 27, 2008),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=94048033.
24. See CORNEL WEST, DEMOCRACY MATTERS: WINNING THE FIGHT AGAINST
IMPERIALISM 68 (2004).
25. See SHELDON S. WOLIN, POLITICS AND VISION: CONTINUITY AND INNOVATION IN
WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 520 (expanded ed. 2004) (1960).
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For democratic lawyers, democracy's scope is broader than the purely
political realm of office holding or policy making. With broad-based
popular participation in governing as the goal, many of these lawyers
interpret government expansively to include the many domains in which
people strive to shape the behavior of others.26 Government-and
potentially self-government--occurs not only in the political realm, but also
in grassroots groups, workplaces, schools, voluntary associations, religious
institutions, and families. It occurs wherever a person, group, or institution
tries to persuade a target to alter its own conduct or the conduct of others.
These lawyers believe that groups, institutions, and communities in which
many share in leadership and governance are typically stronger than those
governed by one or a few. 27 The fundamental aim is to ensure that each of
us can participate-at least sometimes-in individual and collective efforts
to reshape our lives and worlds. For ordinary people to successfully engage
in self-government, these lawyers and their partners believe it is essential to
work collectively and collaboratively with others. And so these lawyers
and their partners aim to seize every opportunity to build infrastructure for
such collaborations and collective ventures.
Applying the concept beyond the political realm, democracy also
becomes an inclusive way of interacting and interconnecting with others as
equals. It is an approach that seeks to maximize contributors, harness
diverse talents and perspectives, and unleash energies. It is grounded in the
conviction that each individual and group has something to contribute to the
life of a community. Democracy is thus also a spirit, a way of life, a way of
being in the world, a way of working with others in collective actions
toward shared, public purposes. 28 It is a commitment to work with others in
a way that is consistent with the world one seeks with them to create. 29 It is
also a clear-eyed understanding that none of that work is easy or conflict-
free.
26. I borrow this concept from French philosopher Michel Foucault, who, late in his life,
turned his attention to the variety of techniques and mentalities of government, a term he
intended expansively to include "the notion of governing oneself, one's children, a family, a
farm, an institution, souls and lives, as well as a locality, province, or state." Piomelli,
Foucault's Allure and Limits, supra note 1, at 442 (citing Michel Foucault, Governmentality,
in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN GOVERNMENTALITY 205 (Graham Burchell et al. eds.,
1994)).
27. Ella Baker, whose vital role in shaping the young leaders of the Student Non-Violent
Coordinating Committee (SNCC) has only recently been fully appreciated, regularly
emphasized the importance of developing ordinary people's capacity for leadership. She
urged the fostering of "group-centered leadership," rather than "leader-centered groups."
Piomelli, Democratic Roots, supra note 1, at 589 (citing JOANNE GRANT, ELLA BAKER:
FREEDOM BOUND 5-6 (1998)). For a description of her democratic vision and its influence
on democratic lawyers, see id. at 587-95.
28. John Dewey is perhaps the foremost advocate of this expansive view of democracy
as a way of life. For an exposition and analysis of his vision of democracy and its influence
on democratic lawyers, see id. at 565-82.
29. See L6PEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING, supra note 1, at 382 ("[L]awyering... must
itself reflect and occasionally even usher in the world we hope to create.").
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At the heart of this democratic vision is a faith in the intelligence (also
broadly construed) and potential of ordinary people, once unleashed by
democratic practices. Rather than presuming that everyday people-
especially people of color or low-income or working-class people-are
duped, defeated, overwhelmed, or quiescent, democratic lawyers seek out
instead the many exceptions to these purported rules. Without ignoring real
needs, these lawyers focus too on identifying and reinforcing individual and
collective assets and strengths. These lawyers and their partners believe that
democratic practices---of inclusion, information sharing, discussion,
deliberation, strategizing, joint action, joint assessment, and mutual
accountability-foster the growth of all participants. These practices result
not only in wiser actions, but they also develop wiser and stronger actors,
better able to act in concert with others to achieve shared ends.
In this view, democracy, rather than simply producing wise political
leaders, enables individuals, groups, and communities to develop and
flourish. It fosters true liberty, understood as the ability to accomplish
one's goals and to grow by acting effectively with others. It instantiates
true equality, understood as wide-scale recognition of individual
incommensurability-the idea that everyone is unique and worthy of
respect, that notions of superiority and inferiority do not apply to
individuals or communities. It engenders affective solidarity, the feeling of
communal bonds, which in turn fuels joint public action and the willingness
to consider and accommodate the interests of others. 30 It also creates
active, self-governing citizens and citizens' groups capable of working in
concert to pursue shared ends and public purposes.
C. Implementing Democratic Values and Practices
This vision of democracy-and the commitment to bring it to life-
suffuses the values and practices of democratic lawyers. These lawyers
practice across a wide range of settings. They work with low-wage, often
immigrant, workers and their organizations, 31 with tenants and their activist
groups, 32 with small businesses facing discrimination, 33 with tribes of First
Peoples and their members, 34 and with a host of rural and urban, low-
income and working-class, often of-color communities. Those
communities face a variety of threats-strip-mining, 35 toxic or hazardous
30. See Piomelli, Democratic Roots, supra note 1, at 572-75 (describing Dewey's
similar understanding of liberty, equality, and fraternity).
31. See generally GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS, supra note I (day laborers,
housekeepers, and gardeners); Ashar, Resistance Movements, supra note 1 (restaurant
workers); Gordon, We Make the Road, supra note 1 (day laborers, housekeepers, and
gardeners); Su, supra note 1 (garment workers).
32. See Marshall, supra note 1; Piomelli, Appreciating Collaborative Lawyering, supra
note 1.
33. See L6pez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice, supra note 1.
34. See Imai, supra note 1; Zuni Cruz, supra note 1.
35. See Rivkin, supra note 1.
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"LULUs" (locally undesirable land uses), 36 elimination of rent controls, 37
potentially gentrifying land use developments, 38 and government-ordered
displacement and relocation.39 They often mobilize and sometimes form
organizations to develop and implement their own visions of community
and economic development.40
A unifying thread is that democratic lawyers regularly work with people
and groups involved in struggles for dignity, survival, self-determination,
and other basic human needs. These lawyers seek to foster and join
collective efforts of low-income and working-class people and people of
color to reshape their own lives and communities. Democratic lawyers
work, in short, to form and support active publics-groups that come
together to understand, confront, and attempt to gain some control over the
forces and actors shaping their lives.4 1  These democratic publics act
together on shared values and commitments and they understand
themselves rationally and emotionally as comprising a community. 42
Across their practice settings, robust, participatory democratic values
imbue these lawyers' aims and methods. Democratic lawyers are
committed to equality, to resisting subordination, to fostering individual and
collective self-government. They are committed to inclusion, to ensuring
that all voices and talents are brought to bear. They insist on respect for the
intelligence and agency of all with whom they work. They value and seek
to build opportunities for face-to-face association and collective action,
which they believe are vital to building power and fostering the human
development of all who participate. These lawyers are committed to two-
way, mutually accountable relationships. They believe everyone must be
open to teaching and to learning. They insist on only pursuing means that
further their (and their partners') ultimate ends. They emphatically reject
benevolent paternalism. They aim instead to foster individuals' and groups'
direct self-expression and self-determination. They are committed to
continually reassessing and retooling tactics and strategies in light of actual
experiences and changing circumstances. 43
36. See COLE & FOSTER, supra note 1; Cole, Models of Environmental Advocacy, supra
note 1; Foster, supra note 1.
37. See Piomelli, Appreciating Collaborative Lawyering, supra note 1.
38. See generally Foster & Glick, supra note 1; Harris et al., supra note 1; L6pez,
Economic Development, supra note 1.
39. See generally White, To Learn and Teach, supra note 1.
40. See generally Bennett, supra note 1.
41. See Piomelli, Democratic Roots, supra note 1, at 580 (citing JOHN DEWEY, THE
PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 15-16 (Swallow Press 1991) (1927)) (discussing John Dewey's
conceptualization of"a public").
42. As Al Haber, a leader of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and codrafter with
Tom Hayden of its manifesto, the Port Huron Statement, wrote, "[D]emocracy is based on
the idea of a 'political' public-a body that shares a range of common values and
commitments, an institutional pattern of interaction and an image of themselves as a
functioning community." JAMES MILLER, "DEMOCRACY IS IN THE STREETS": FROM PORT
HURON TO THE SIEGE OF CHICAGO 69 (1987).
43. For a fuller exposition of these democratic values and their implementation in
democratic lawyers' work, see Piomelli, Democratic Roots, supra note i, at 598-611.
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Democratic lawyers implement these values in their relationships with
the individuals and groups with whom they work and in the
multidimensional efforts in which they join. Two examples will, I hope,
ground these ideas. The first (drawn from Jennifer Gordon's descriptions
of the Workplace Project in Hempstead, Long Island44) explores in some
depth a democratic approach to a common lawyering task. The second
(drawn again from the Workplace Project, as well as other collaborations
between lawyers, immigrant workers, and their groups45) sketches the
breadth of approaches that democratic lawyers and their partners employ.
Contrasting democratic lawyers' approach to "community education," for
example, with that of their more conventional peers reveals how democratic
values inform and transform specific lawyering tasks. Many lawyers, both
legal aid and pro bono attorneys, equate community legal education with
"Know Your Rights" presentations, in which a lawyer (or perhaps a public
official) makes a presentation to a preexisting group of lay people for whom
she translates legal information about substantive legal rights and
procedural mechanisms for enforcing them.46 Besides leaving room for
questions at the end-and possibly asking a few calibrating questions
herself at the outset to ensure a fit with the audience-these presentations,
as conventionally implemented, are typically not highly interactive or
participatory affairs; they often resemble a lecture, followed perhaps by
brief questions and answers. 47
Democratic lawyers aim to avoid such a one-directional, didactic
approach, with its implicit message of "here's what I know that you need to
learn." Instead, a democratic lawyer would likely approach the group with
greater curiosity and more clearly conveyed respect. Her goal would not
just be to transmit information, but also to learn from and with group
members about how the information might most meaningfully affect their
lives and her potential work with them and similarly situated others. She
would thus focus on exploring what the group already collectively knows,
what they make of what they know, and what else they would like to learn.
(Many questions might well be posed in the first-person plural: What do
we know? What do we think? What else do we need to know? How will
44. See GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS, supra note 1, at 67-304; Gordon, We Make
the Road, supra note 1.
45. See GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS, supra note 1, at 67-304; Ashar, Resistance
Movements, supra note 1; Gordon, We Make the Road, supra note 1; Su, supra note 1.
46. I do not underestimate the importance, or difficulty, of effectively translating legal
provisions and practices to make them understandable to nonlawyers. As Jerry L6pez has
noted, this is a vitally important skill for a democratic lawyer. See L6PEZ, REBELLIOUS
LAWYERING, supra note 1, at 43-44 (referring to the need to "translate in two directions," to
be "bicultural and bilingual" in "both the lay and the legal worlds").
47. Among the implicit premises of many "Know Your Rights" efforts are: that the
audience's lack of information is its primary deficit; that the lawyer/presenter can fill that
gap; and that the lawyer/presenter has no significant needs of her own-other than to convey
information and perhaps to meet "outreach" targets or goals. For an exploration of a broad
range of approaches to community education, see Ingrid V. Eagly, Community Education:
Creating a New Vision of Legal Services Practice, 4 CLINICAL L. REv. 433 (1998).
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we learn it?) The session would be inclusive, participatory, and
conversational. It would resemble a seminar or colloquium in which
participants share what becomes a group discussion. The lawyer would
encourage group members to talk and to comment on each other's stories
and interpretations. She would likely both facilitate discussion and share
legal information-but that information would aim to spur, rather than end,
discussion. The session would also be deliberative and purposeful. "What
the law says" would not be the central focus or touchstone; a variety of
other potential avenues of redress would be explored. The lawyer might
well encourage the group to discuss the fairness and adequacy of any legal
provisions or procedures discussed. She might invite the group to think
together about why "the law" is the way it is, about whose interests are
served and whose are not, and about what a more adequate approach or
system might look like. She likely would aim to link the session to some
form of group action, exploring how the group might use, contest, or ignore
the information to accomplish its aims. In all these ways, a democratic
lawyer would work with the group to collectively explore how legal and
nonlegal knowledge and action might inform and shape their efforts to work
toward desired social change. 48
Participatory democratic values also infuse the multidimensional array of
approaches in which, for example, these lawyers (and the low-wage
workers, organizers, and other allies with whom they join) routinely
engage. As the literature has explored, their tactics and strategies include:
street-corner and church-hall organizing of day laborers and housekeepers;
picketing outside the homes or businesses of targeted employers; public
education campaigns through newspapers, radio spots, and comic books;
extended leadership training courses; creating a participatory worker-run
organization with multiple opportunities/obligations for members to sit on
the board of directors, run committees, plan strategies and tactics, and
interact with funders; drafting model employment agreements; creating
landscaping and housekeeping collectives; and encouraging low-wage
workers to design, draft, and lobby for passage of a new unpaid wage
enforcement law.49 Tactics also include: advocating for groups of formerly
enslaved garment workers against immigration authorities intent on
detaining them, resorting to direct action when legal arguments fail;
actively involving a multi-racial group of garment workers in multiple
facets of federal lawsuits seeking liability against their direct employers as
well as the manufacturers and retailers who control the industry and benefit
48. This paragraph is drawn from Jennifer Gordon's rich and insightful discussion of the
Workplace Project's efforts to integrate "rights talk and collective action" and the content
and style of the "Worker's Course" that it required its members to complete. See GORDON,
SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS, supra note 1, at 148-84.
49. See id. at 92-96, 99 (organizing laborers and housekeepers), 86-87 (picketing), 118-
20 (public education), 125-29 (leadership training course), 116-41 (worker-run
organization), 99-103 (employment agreements), 103-04 (creating collectives), 104-07,
241-80 (passing wage law).
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from sweatshop conditions; 50 litigating wage and hour claims on behalf of
individual workers in conjunction with workplace organizing campaigns in
a manner aimed to support organizational capacity-building; filing and
defending legal actions to protect workers' rights to engage in direct action;
and helping to form a worker-owned and -run restaurant. 51 Each of these
tactics and strategies manifests a democratic commitment to working with
ordinary people and their groups and allies to try to form an engaged public
(where none initially exists) that can collectively pursue the shared goal of
equal justice.
II. CHALLENGING INDIVIDUALISTIC, ARISTOCRATIC, AND FORMALISTIC
ELEMENTS OF MAINSTREAM CULTURAL CONDITIONING AND LAWYERS'
PROFESSIONAL SOCIALIZATION
In addition to confronting neoliberalism and its agenda and to
challenging the prevailing "thin" conception of what democracy means and
how it is practiced, democratic lawyering also challenges three more pillars
of mainstream U.S. cultural and cognitive conditioning and lawyers'
professional socialization. The individualistic, aristocratic, and formalistic
cultural predispositions that democratic lawyers and their partners challenge
have long pervaded-even as they have never completely monopolized-
mainstream U.S. culture and lawyers' professional socialization. These
cultural and cognitive predispositions suffuse the reigning approach to
"public interest" lawyering that democratic lawyers aim to supplant.
In referring to culture and to cultural conditioning, I intend by culture:
"those ways of approaching, understanding, and acting in the world that are
widely (but not necessarily universally) shared by members of a social
group-and are often hotly contested by some group members. '52 Culture
is like "a current that we and other members of our social group(s) move
with, or against, and even occasionally redirect, as we strive to make sense
of and act in the world." 53
A. Challenging Individualism: From Isolation to Freedom-Enhancing and
Wisdom-Enhancing Interconnection
One of the fundamental predispositions that democratic lawyering
challenges is the deeply rooted custom in mainstream U.S. culture to view
people as, first and foremost, individuals, unconnected to and independent
from others. As Benjamin Barber frames it, the dominant "inertial" or
50. See Su, supra note 1, at 407-13.
51. See Ashar, Resistance Movements, supra note 1, at 1899-916 (litigation); Fordham
Law Community Economic Development Clinic, Docket of Major Client Projects: Colors
Worker-Owned Restaurant, available at http://law.fordham.edu/ihtml/cl-
2ced_docket.ihtml?id=834 (last visited Feb. 16, 2009) (describing formation of worker-
owned cooperative restaurant).
52. Ascanio Piomelli, Cross-Cultural Lawyering by the Book.- The Latest Clinical Texts
and a Sketch of a Future Agenda, 4 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 131, 135 (2006).
53. Id.
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"preconceptual" frame of mainstream U.S. culture-the starting point for
our consideration of the world-casts humans as "separate, integral, self-
contained, unitary particles or atoms" and insists that "the human
perspective is first of all the perspective of... the isolated individual
One." 54  It is through this lens, which I shall refer to as "atomized
individualism," that mainstream U.S. culture trains us to view ourselves,
each other, our society, and our political and economic systems. 55
Mainstream U.S. culture teaches that individuals and groups are opposing
dualisms, with the latter often constituting a threat to the former.
Individuals are presumed fully formed, complete, authentic selves on their
own. Collectives are commonly understood as potential dangers to those
fully formed individuals, especially to their liberty. Indeed, liberty is
primarily understood as freedom from the overreaching demands of
others-especially groups of others. Groups often mean trouble:
conspiracies, mobs, peer pressure, and other destructive forms of energy.
They demand and instill conformity. 56 They impinge upon, and sometimes
snuff out, autonomy, individuality, and freedom.
In this view of a world where each is a dissociated One, separation is
emphasized and valued. Independence and detachment from others is
presumed the path not just to freedom, but also toward knowledge and
wisdom; it is the way to obtain clear (objective) perspective and accurate
understanding. Connection with others risks clouding judgment, in part
because it ushers in emotion, which is seen as reason's enemy.57
Atomized individualism holds sway in the legal profession as well.
Among lawyers as a profession, we pledge fealty to each client as a solitary
54. BARBER, supra note 10, at 33. Benjamin Barber refers not to mainstream U.S.
culture, but to liberalism-by which he means the core overlapping political ideas and
assumptions emphasizing liberty, property, privacy, and representation that are shared by
both the U.S. Center-Left (colloquially referred to as "liberals") and Center-Right
(colloquially referred to as "conservatives"). He contrasts liberalism with
communitarianism. Id.
I choose instead to refer to mainstream U.S. culture because the ideas and
assumptions operate far beyond the narrowly political realm and because I wish to highlight
that even as they prevail, they are still contested. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying
text.
55. I thank Mark Aaronson for reminding me that C. B. MacPherson insightfully
explored the fundamentally possessive nature of this conception of individualism in which
the individual is considered "the proprietor of his own person or capacities, owing nothing to
society for them" and is seen not "as part of a larger social whole, but as an owner of
himself." C. B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM:
HOBBES TO LOCKE 3 (1962).
56. Collectives in this view can lead to stultifying "groupthink," a term first formulated
by Irving Janis to describe "a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply
involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members' strivings for unanimity override their
motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action." See IRVING L. JANIS,
VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF FOREIGN-POLICY DECISIONS AND
FIASCOES 9 (1972).
57. For a summary and refutation of this alleged conflict between reason and emotion,
see Angela P. Harris & Marjorie M. Shultz, "A(nother) Critique of Pure Reason": Toward
Civic Virtue in Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1773 (1993).
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One whose interests we must zealously pursue (within permissible bounds)
over the interests of all others.58 As Ann Shalleck has explored, the
standard law school classroom assumes-and teaches students and future
lawyers to assume-that "[c]lients simply want to maximize monetary
gains (or minimize losses) and achieve the greatest possible degree of
freedom and autonomy in their actions. '59 The dominant approach to
lawyering taught in most every law school clinical program, client-centered
lawyering, 60 is also shaped by atomized individualism. Client-centered
lawyering centers on enhancing the autonomy and central decision-making
authority of the individual client;61 but it often views that client as a
dissociated One, likely to resist entreaties to alter a preferred course of
conduct to accommodate countervailing public imperatives. 62
Democratic lawyers, and those with whom they join, swim against these
individualistic cultural and professional currents.
These lawyers and their partners reject atomized individualism. They see
people as connected to others-to other individuals and to groups. Instead
of viewing other people and groups as threats to individuality, democratic
lawyers consider them vehicles for attaining individuality. Individuality is
not an initial state; it is instead a result of our interactions with others-we
learn, grow, figure out who we are, and achieve many of our aims through
our interactions with others. In this view, individuals are formed-albeit
never completely or identically-by their relationships with groups.
Indeed, these lawyers and those with whom they work see people not only
as connected, but also as fundamentally interdependent.63
58. For a critique of this central premise of legal ethics, see WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE
PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS' ETHICS (1998).
59. Ann Shalleck, Constructions of the Client Within Legal Education, 45 STAN L. REV.
1731, 1736 (1993).
60. See DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A
CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1977) (articulating original formulation of client-centered
approach to lawyering); DAVID A. BINDER, PAUL BERGMAN, SUSAN PRICE & PAUL R.
TREMBLAY, LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (2d ed. 2004)
(presenting latest formulation by original proponents and new collaborators); Robert D.
Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 501
(1990) (sympathetic critic's survey of potential justifications for and necessary modifications
to client-centeredness); Kruse, supra note 6, at 370-71 (describing dominance of client-
centered model in clinical education).
61. See Kruse, supra note 6, at 399-414, 419-26 (discussing multiple understandings of
autonomy that underlie different interpretations of client-centered lawyering).
62. For a persistent critique, grounded in communitarianism and religious conviction, of
client-centeredness's starkly individualistic bent, see THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F.
COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 15-29 (1994).
63. For a provocative and astute examination of the West's discomfort with
acknowledging interdependence-and especially the discomfort of those in privileged
positions in the West-see MaivAn Clech Lam, Feeling Foreign in Feminism, 19 SIGNS 865
(1994).
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Democratic lawyers believe that individuals and groups both matter; they
each warrant attention and support. Without losing sight of each person's
uniqueness and dignity, these lawyers and their partners also see people in
the context of the groups and communities to which they already belong or
that they might join. As one democratic lawyer emphasizes, "Community
lawyers do more than represent individual clients. They represent clients in
definable communities. They learn about the cultures, values, and beliefs of
the people in the community. They see problems of individual clients in the
context of the community. '64 Such a contextualized examination of "the
community" will recognize that communities, like cultures, are not often of
a single mind-they too are sites of contest.
Without assuming that groups or communities are univocal or
harmonious, these lawyers and their partners appreciate the potential links
and insights that flow from paying attention to commonalities of race, class,
gender, culture, ethnicity, neighborhood, age, vocation, religion, politics,
sexual orientation, immigration status, etc. They pay attention to, and often
build on, these markers of identity-seeing them as potential lines both of
unity and cleavage, as well as lines along which institutional or structural
power dynamics often play out.
Democratic lawyers embrace a practice and sensibility of connection.
They themselves strive to connect with others. They also aim to connect
those with whom they work to others who might share or further their
interests. These lawyers and their partners believe it is through effective
connection and joint action with others that low-income and working-class
people and people of color can best protect themselves and achieve their
goals.65 Consequently, these lawyers and those with whom they join often
seek to foster or strengthen horizontal ties; they look for other groups or
communities who may have faced similar struggles. Connection creates
awareness of potential allies and undertakings with which people and
groups might join (or from which they might learn), thereby increasing the
array of potential paths to achieving shared ends. Democratic connection
also potentially creates feelings of solidarity and community that engender
hope, courage, a sense of efficacy, and the will to persist.66
64. Zuni Cruz, supra note 1, at 572 (quoting Barbra Creel et al., Univ. of N.M. Inst. for
Access to Justice, Statement on Community Lawyering (1996) (unpublished statement))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
65. As Tocqueville noted, "In democratic peoples.., all citizens are independent and
weak; they can do almost nothing by themselves, and none of them can oblige those like
themselves to lend them their cooperation. They therefore all fall into impotence if they do
not learn to aid each other freely." ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 490
(Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop eds. & trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2000) (1835); see
also Jeffrey Rosen, I-Commerce: Tocqueville, the Internet, and the Legalized Self, 70
FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 8 (2001).
66. See FRANCESCA POLLETTA, FREEDOM IS AN ENDLESS MEETING: DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 8-12 (2002).
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These lawyers see groups, especially grassroots groups formed to pursue
shared aims, as vital democratic spaces. 67 In these settings, members share
and process their knowledge and experience, learn from each other,
strategize and deliberate together, act on their own behalf together, assess
their joint actions, and plot new ones.68
Without denying the value of privacy and temporary retreats into
solitude, democratic lawyers view extended isolation or separation from
others as dangerous. Rather than seeing detachment as a source of impartial
wisdom, these lawyers believe that-when uninformed by connection with
diverse others-it leads to dangerous myopia and even ignorance. It
deprives one's own efforts of information, insights, allies, and potential
avenues of relief. For democratic lawyers, connection with others,
especially with people and groups with different experiences and
perspectives, provides a vital source of knowledge and an indispensible
feedback loop to continually reassess and retool tactics and strategies.
B. Challenging Subordination: Rejecting the Exclusive Rule of the Well-
Schooled Aristoi, Redefining Intelligence and Expertise
Mainstream U.S. culture is not only intensely individualistic, it is also
deeply aristocratic, if one returns to the roots of the term. Aristokratia, the
combination of aristoi ("the best" or "the excellent") and kratos ("to rule"
or "power"), means "the rule of the best." 69 As we have seen, selecting the
best to rule was the fundamental goal of the framers of the U.S.
Constitution and remains the focus of Schumpeterian democracy. 70
This aristocratic bent is not limited to the political system; it pervades
mainstream U.S. society, with its oft-asserted commitment to the concept of
meritocracy (a more palatable term than aristocracy) and its claim to be one.
The dominant presumption is that those in key decision-making positions
(not just in government, but throughout the society and economy) are there
because they deserve to be, because they have proven themselves to be the
best. The presumption is, of course, rebuttable. Nepotism, cronyism, and
other forms of favoritism persist, but they do so as exceptions to the general
rule.
67. Sara Evans and Harry Boyte call these settings "free spaces" that "create new
opportunities for self-definition, for the development of public and leadership skills, for a
new confidence in the possibilities of participation, and for wider mappings of the
connections between the movement members and other groups and institutions." SARA M.
EVANS & HARRY C. BOYTE, FREE SPACES: THE SOURCES OF DEMOCRATIC CHANGE IN
AMERICA, at xix (2002); see also Foster, supra note 1, at 838-39.
68. As Professor Gordon describes, democratic groups are committed to "sharing
information widely and to creating a series of opportunities, informal as well as formal, for
the issues facing the group to be understood and discussed by members," enabling "daily
exercise of the skills, the interaction, and the improvisations that make participation
meaningful, rich, and effective." GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS, supra note 1, at 291-92.
69. See JOSIAH OBER, MASS AND ELITE IN DEMOCRATIC ATHENS: RHETORIC, IDEOLOGY,
AND THE POWER OF THE PEOPLE 13, 19 (1989).
70. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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In our purportedly meritocratic society, intelligence and drive (often
described as a "willingness to work hard") are widely considered the
principal determinants of who qualifies, or should qualify, as among the
best.71 The definition of intelligence is, however, a troublingly narrow one.
Outside the ranks of entrepreneurs, who seem to comprise a special case,
intelligence in mainstream U.S. culture is almost invariably equated with
erudition, i.e., with knowledge derived through reading and schooling.
Expertise too, which originally referred to someone with extensive direct
experience, 72 is now largely equated with formal schooling in an academic
discipline. Educators in each profession and discipline convey their field's
essential knowledge and bestow upon their students at graduation the
academic credential that marks them too as experts, worthy of being
heeded. Professionals and other credentialed experts are presumed, by
virtue of their education and positions of authority, to be uniquely well-
qualified to diagnose ills and to design and implement necessary remedies.
The rest of society is expected to heed these professionals and experts.
In mainstream U.S. culture, the corollary of the meritocratic claim is
perhaps even more firmly entrenched: those who do not rise to become
entrepreneurs, managers, professionals, or experts in intellectual realms
have failed to rise for a reason of their own doing-because they lack the
requisite intelligence and drive. Those who do not fill those ranks, i.e.,
low-income and working-class people (disproportionately people of color
and immigrants), are widely presumed not very smart, lacking in cognitive
skills, initiative, and judgment. 73 Their jobs and even their lives are (tacitly
but pervasively) considered to require little thought. They are commonly
seen as in need of information and guidance from professionals and experts.
They are certainly not considered important sources of information or
guidance to professionals or other experts-let alone potential partners of
those professionals or experts.
Perhaps no profession in the United States is more predisposed to
aristocracy than lawyers. The suggestions of Alexis de Tocqueville 74 and
71. Intelligence seems to have eclipsed civic virtue, which, in the political sphere, had
been the central qualifying trait of classical republicanism. See, e.g., J. G. A. POCOCK, THE
MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC
REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975).
72. "Expert" is derived from the past participle of the Latin "experiri" meaning "to try,
test" and thus meant someone tried and tested, a "person wise through experience." See
Online Etymology Dictionary, http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?search=expert&
searchmode=none (last visited Feb. 17, 2009).
73. See, e.g., Piomelli, supra note 52, at 174-75 (articulating prevalent stereotypes in
U.S. of working-class people); see also supra note 19 (describing political scientists'
characterizations of "lower-class" and working-class "masses").
74. See, e.g., ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 263-70 (J. P. Mayer
ed., George Lawrence trans., Harper Perennial 1988) (1835) (characterizing lawyers, whom
he considered "aristocrats" by "habits and taste," including "habit of order," but "of the
people" by "birth and interest," as playing vital checking role in American democracy).
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Louis Brandeis, 75 among others, that lawyers should play roles akin to
Platonic guardians in our society no doubt contribute to this predisposition.
The valorization of judicial review and of the importance of checking
popular excess also leads lawyers in this direction. Legal education itself
inculcates a strong message of epistemic superiority: lawyers not only
think differently than others, but (implicitly) we think better. Once we as
lawyers are instructed as to the ends a client seeks to achieve, it is our
primary role to design and implement on our own a wise strategy to achieve
those ends.
Democratic lawyers resist each of these aristocratic elements of
mainstream U.S. culture and lawyers' professional socialization. These
lawyers' commitment to expanding ordinary people's opportunities to
engage in self-government directly challenges the preeminent role that
lawyers and other experts currently play in government, in both the narrow
sense of policy formation and policy implementation and in the broader
sense of efforts to shape the behavior of others.
Democratic lawyers reject mainstream culture's pejorative stereotypes of
low-income and working-class people, people of color, and their groups.
Because they work side by side with these individuals and groups, these
lawyers are daily reminded of the stereotypes' inaccuracy. These lawyers
regularly observe the insight and resourcefulness of the people with whom
they work. They appreciate the substantial thought, judgment, perception,
and tactical and strategic decision making that pervade blue- and pink-collar
work76 and people's efforts to manage subordinate status and still feed,
clothe, shelter, educate, and protect themselves, their families, and loved
ones. 77 These lawyers value the savvy, courage, and will that ordinary
people bring when they work toward their own liberation, toward achieving
dignity and first-class citizenship.
Democratic lawyers interpret intelligence far more broadly than the
book-learning and logical-analytical skills that mainstream culture equates
with intelligence. Like other advocates of multiple intelligences, these
lawyers appreciate, for example, narrative intelligence (the ability to tell
effective stories), intrapersonal intelligence (the ability to understand
oneself, one's emotions, and motivations), and especially interpersonal or
social intelligence (the ability to understand, get along with, and work
75. See, e.g., Louis D. Brandeis, The Opportunity in the Law, Address Before the
Harvard Ethical Society (May 4, 1905), in BUSINESs-A PROFESSION 321 (Agustus M.
Kelley ed., 1971) (1914) (viewing lawyers as "holding a position of independence, between
the wealthy and the people, prepared to curb the excesses of either").
76. See MIKE ROSE, THE MIND AT WORK: VALUING THE INTELLIGENCE OF THE AMERICAN
WORKER (2004).
77. See L6PEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING, supra note 1, at 57-60; Piomelli, Democratic
Roots, supra note 1, at 604.
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effectively with other people). 78 They see these intelligences, along with
traits such as courage, dependability, and fortitude, as invaluable to
collective public action-and prevalent among many who lack formal
schooling.
Instead of viewing knowledge and intelligence as purely individual traits,
these lawyers also see knowledge and intelligence as properties of groups.
They believe that groups often have within them, as a result of the multiple
unique and shared experiences of their members, a collective knowledge
and wisdom. Democratic lawyers believe this knowledge should be
respected, explored, and tapped to guide action.
In large part, democratic lawyers seek to model a radically different
conception of expertise and professionalism. Rather than exclusively
focusing on their clients' deficits or needs and providing legal services to
fill them, these lawyers also seek out clients', groups', and communities'
assets and strategize how to build upon and connect them.79 Rather than
simply bestow desired outcomes on their clients, these lawyers seek to work
side by side with clients and allied groups to attain those ends together.
In so doing, these lawyers reject the vanguard role of preeminent problem
solver that many other lawyers--especially liberal and progressive lawyers
who identify themselves as working "in the public interest"-so readily
adopt. Democratic lawyers are always looking for partners with whom to
join. They value thinking (and acting) "like a lawyer." Indeed they deem it
essential to think and act like a highly skilled and creative lawyer.80 But
they do not believe that thinking and acting like a lawyer is the only way to
think and act, or the only way to diagnose and solve a problem. Instead,
they believe that disciplinary isolation-only thinking within, and
interacting with fellow members of, one's own discipline-places blinders
on its practitioners. It leads one to "disaggregate[] complex problems into
isolated elements and treat[] those with one-dimensional interventions"
unlikely to fully resolve a problem. 81
These lawyers and their partners aim therefore to interpret and address
situations from multiple perspectives and disciplines. Attracted to
multidimensional and multidisciplinary analyses, strategies, and
assessments-and driven both by curiosity and humility-these lawyers do
not just ask, how might a lawyer address this situation? They also ask:
How might an organizer? How might an educator? How might a
journalist? How might a scientist? How might a politician? How might a
78. See HOWARD GARDNER, FRAMES OF MIND: THE THEORY OF MULTIPLE
INTELLIGENCES (10th anniversary ed., 1993) (1983).
79. For a similar approach by nonlawyers, see JOHN P. KRETZMANN & JOHN L.
MCKNIGHT, BUILDING COMMUNITIES FROM THE INSIDE OUT: A PATH TOWARD FINDING AND
MOBILIZING A COMMUNITY'S ASSETS (1993).
80. See Gordon, Not the Protagonist, supra note 1, at 2142.
81. Harry C. Boyte, Dewey Lecture at the University of Michigan: A Different Kind of
Politics: John Dewey and the Meaning of Citizenship in the 21 st Century 2 (Nov. 1, 2002),
available at http://www.imaginingamerica.org/Apdfs/BoyteDeweyLecture.pdf.
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lobbyist? How might a philanthropist? How might an entrepreneur? 82
Rather than presuming that their professional knowledge and training--
what they already know-is sufficient, these lawyers are committed to
constantly expanding their knowledge base and repertoires by learning how
others interpret and act. So they also ask: How do the people living
through the situation view it? What do they think about how to address it?
How can they-and we together-work most effectively with others to
address it?83 These lawyers and their partners view their mission and
practice as an effort to include the insights and talents of all in collective
efforts of self-government.
C. Challenging Formalism: From Establishing Rights to Building Power
On issues of equality and freedom, mainstream U.S. culture and the legal
profession both direct our attention toward formal equality and formal
rights, toward constitutional and statutory provisions and what they say.
The legal system-of courts and legislatures-is seen as the primary forum
in which matters of freedom and equality are determined. Courts
especially, with their ability to declare and protect rights, are seen as vital
guardians of the interests of minorities. The key undertaking in ensuring
freedom and equality in this view is to perfect "the law"-understood as the
rules announced by courts and the provisions and interpretations of
constitutions, statutes, and regulations.
Unspoken, but widely shared, assumptions are that important issues of
freedom and equality can be presented in ways the legal system can resolve;
that only relatively small, incremental adjustments in the law are necessary
to move from status quo to social justice; that skillful action within the legal
system alone is sufficient to make those adjustments; that the legal system
and the rest of society will be bound by them; and that adjustments in the
law will directly translate into freedom and equality (at least of opportunity)
for those currently denied. In short, it is assumed that changes in the law
will inevitably reshape people's living conditions.
In this focus on formal rights and changing the letter and interpretation of
the law, little attention is directed to issues of power-other than the power
82. Democratic lawyers do not simply pose these questions to themselves. As necessary
and appropriate in each circumstance, they actually seek out organizers, educators,
journalists, scientists, politicians, lobbyists, philanthropists, and entrepreneurs to become
familiar with how those disciplines interpret and act.
83. Democratic lawyers also ask a series of contextual questions. As Gordon has
summarized, those questions often include:
Who [are] the players here? What [is] their history in this place and elsewhere?
What position [have] various government agencies and actors taken in the battle,
and what stake [do] they have? How [can] they be moved toward the group's
side? What [have] other organizations tried in the face of similar threats, and why
might those tactics be likely or unlikely to succeed here? How [does] this one
struggle fit into the group's broader goals for change? ... [W]ithin this setting and
facing this particular cast of institutional and individual stakeholders, how [can]
this organization build power to solve the problems it face[s]?
Gordon, Not the Protagonist, supra note 1, at 2136.
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of ideas. Courts are presumed unmoved by the power of the parties before
them and largely insulated from the society at large. So long as both sides
are represented by competent counsel, only impartially determined facts,
logic, argument, and precedent will be determinative. Justice will be
achieved, and freedom and equality won, if the currently underrepresented
have access to skilled legal advocates.8 4
Democratic lawyers reject what they consider the misguided formalism
of focusing narrowly on the judicial and legal arena (and especially on
perfecting the law) as the primary way to attain freedom, dignity, and
justice for low-income and working-class people, people of color, and their
communities. The aim of these democratic lawyers and their partners is not
simply legal reform, but ending subordination and deprivation. They are
unconvinced that legal reform alone-unconnected to other collective
efforts or to the groups on whose behalf reformers believe they act-will in
fact directly translate into meaningful and lasting progress in ending
subordination and deprivation.
Instead, democratic lawyers pay close attention to issues of power. By
power they mean not simply power over others, but also power to act
effectively in concert with others. 85 These lawyers and their partners do not
see the legal system as insulated from the rest of society; they believe it is
deeply influenced by it-as the legal realists did. 86 They see the relative
power of parties as pivotal to the reactions of judges, legislatures, public
officials, the media, adversaries, and potential allies. These lawyers believe
that popular mobilization and organization and effective coalition building
enhances groups' and communities' power-and outsiders' perception of
that power.
Democratic lawyers' attention is not, contrary to common misperception,
primarily focused internally on the lawyer-client dyad, on obsessing over
their potential power over clients. While these lawyers are mindful of
power dynamics in their interactions with clients and groups, they are not
paralyzed by fear or guilt. Like an urban myth, this misperception resists
84. This is the ideology of what Thomas Hilbink labels the "elite/vanguard" public
interest bar. See Thomas M. Hilbink, You Know the Type... : Categories of Cause
Lawyering, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 657, 670-81 (2004).
85. For a detailed discussion of ideas about power and their influence on democratic
lawyering, see Piomelli, Foucault's Allure and Limits, supra note 1, at 445-80. For an
analogous emphasis on the positive power to act in concert with others, see HANNAH
ARENDT, ON VIOLENCE 44 (1969) (defining power as capacity to act in concert with others);
EDWARD T. CHAMBERS, ROOTS FOR RADICALS: ORGANIZING FOR POWER, ACTION, AND
JUSTICE 27-31 (2003) (describing organizing philosophy of contemporary, post-Alinsky
Industrial Areas Foundation and its understanding of "relational power").
86. See, e.g., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (William W. Fisher Ill, Morton J. Horwitz &
Thomas A. Reed eds., 1993); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 169-212 (1992); LAURA KALMAN,
LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960 (1986); Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now,
76 CAL. L. REV. 465 (1988) (reviewing KALMAN, supra).
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efforts to detail its inaccuracy. 87 It is even spread by kindred spirits whom I
consider democratic lawyers. 88
In fact, democratic lawyers focus squarely on fostering clients' ability to
work collectively with others in public efforts to reshape their living
conditions and communities. Their aim-shared with many organizers-is
not just to win particular struggles or desired policy outcomes, but to win in
ways that enhance clients' and groups' capacity to win future struggles and
outcomes too.89 Democratic lawyers' focus is on building the power of
their low-income, working-class, and of-color clients. It is, in short, a focus
on demokratia--on enhancing the power of ordinary people and enabling
them to actively and effectively participate in individual and collective self-
government.
CONCLUSION
As this essay has explored, a distinctive vision of democracy-a robust,
participatory, egalitarian, and developmental one-guides an emerging
movement of social-change lawyers. This democratic vision emphasizes
87. As I have explored at length, see Piomelli, Appreciating Collaborative Lawyering,
supra note 1, at 443-86, the claim that democratic lawyering theorists myopically focused in
the 1980s and 1990s on internal dynamics of the one-on-one relationship between individual
attorney and client-obsessing over lawyers' likely domination of low-income clients and
ignoring collective action and opportunities to challenge institutional power-is simply not
true of the approach's founding and leading advocates, Professors L6pez and White. For
leading statements of this critique, see Gary L. Blasi, What's a Theory for?: Notes on
Reconstructing Poverty Law Scholarship, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1063 (1994); William H.
Simon, The Dark Secret of Progressive Lawyering: A Comment on Poverty Law
Scholarship in the Post-modern, Post-Reagan Era, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1099 (1994).
The critique did, however, have merit with regard to Professor Alfieri, see supra
note 1, who linked his ideas with L6pez and White, but endorsed a narrow vision of
collaboration that left little room for lawyers to do more than parrot their clients and paid
little attention, after his first article, to collective action in extrajudicial arenas. See Piomelli,
Appreciating Collaborative Lawyering, supra note 1, at 465-70. But the critics failed to
recognize that L6pez and White tempered their postmodern insights about attorney-client
power dynamics, avoided dire warnings against "interpretive violence," and, most
importantly, connected their vision of collaboration to an imperative to join with others to
foster collective social and political activism. See id. at 485.
88. See, e.g., Ashar, Collective Mobilization, supra note 1, at 406 (stating that, "[w]hile
we attend to the dynamic within our relationships with clients and learn how to collaborate
with them, we are not preoccupied with the potential of lawyer domination," and thus
implying that some lawyers who attend to relationships with clients and aim to collaborate
with them are preoccupied by potential lawyer domination (citing Ashar, Resistance
Movements, supra note 1, at 1919-20)); Gordon, Not the Protagonist, supra note 1, at 2143-
44 (lauding recent shift "away from ... the fear that lawyers will inevitably dominate and
even derail community efforts," a fear she contends has "preoccupied scholars of law and
social change for decades," but for which she cites no specific authorities); Harris et al.,
supra note 1, at 2115 (asserting, without citation to specific works, that "dread of complicity
in domination shaped the writing on social justice lawyering throughout the 1980s and
1990s").
89. See Piomelli, Foucault's Allure and Limits, supra note 1, at 479-80. The
community organizing literature often emphasizes the indispensability of ensuring that, in
every struggle, attention is focused on building long-run organizational capacity. See, e.g.,
LEE STAPLES, ROOTS TO POWER: A MANUAL FOR GRASSROOTS ORGANIZING 4-7 (1984).
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collectively building and strengthening infrastructure for ordinary people's
participation in public action and self-rule. It rejects the elite-centered
model that has long shaped what most in the United States believe
democracy to entail. These democratic lawyers (and the people, groups,
and institutions with whom they join) engage on the front lines of the clash
with the neoliberal agenda that has dominated the past three decades.
In implementing their robust vision of democracy and confronting
neoliberalism, these democratic lawyers also challenge key individualistic,
aristocratic, and formalistic pillars of mainstream U.S. culture and lawyers'
professional socialization. In fundamental ways, these lawyers and their
partners see and act differently than their mainstream peers (not just in the
corporate and private bar, but in the "public interest" bar as well). Their
ideas and practices challenge reigning cultural and professional
understandings and practices-about who we are and how we are
constituted as a society, economy, and polity; about who acts and who
follows, who matters and who doesn't, and which sorts of knowledge
should be cultivated and heeded; about how justice and change are properly
measured and most successfully pursued; and about what lawyers do and
with whom they do it. At heart, these democratic lawyers believe-as
much of the rest of U.S. society and the bar do not-that ordinary people,
acting collectively with peers, receptive professionals, and other allies, can
and must play a leading role in efforts to reshape our society and political
economy.
1408 [Vol. 77
HeinOnline  -- 77 Fordham L. Rev. 1408 2008-2009
